The social virtue of blind deference by Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer
Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
THE SOCIAL VIRTUE OF BLIND DEFERENCE 
 
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij 
University of Kent, Canterbury 
 
Abstract: Recently, it has become popular to account for knowledge and other epistemic states in terms of 
epistemic virtues. The present paper focuses on an epistemic virtue relevant when deferring to others in tes-
timonial contexts. It is argued that, while many virtue epistemologists will accept that epistemic virtue can be 
exhibited in cases involving epistemically motivated hearers, carefully vetting their testimonial sources for 
signs of untrustworthiness prior to deferring, anyone who accepts that also has to accept that an agent may 
exhibit epistemic virtue in certain cases of blind deference, involving someone soaking up everything he or 
she is told without any hesitation. Moreover, in order to account for the kind of virtue involved in the rele-
vant cases of blind deference, virtue epistemologists need to abandon a widespread commitment to 
personalism, i.e., the idea that virtue is possessed primarily on account of features internal to the psychology 
of the person, and accept that some virtues are social virtues, possessed in whole or in large part on account 
of the person being embedded in a reliable social environment. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently, it has become popular to account for knowledge and other positive epistemic states in terms of 
epistemic virtues.1 While much of traditional epistemology has focused on features of belief (e.g., eviden-
tial relations between belief contents), virtue epistemology focuses on features of persons, and on their 
dispositions to think, reason or believe in certain ways in particular. Virtue epistemologists disagree about 
whether the relevant dispositions need to be reliable, acquired (as opposed to innate), and accompanied 
by an appropriate kind of motivation in order to qualify as virtues. We will consider these disagreements 
in due course. The relevant disagreements will be discussed in the context of a particular epistemic virtue, 
                                                     
1
 While philosophical theorising about virtue goes all the way back to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, current interest 
in epistemic (or intellectual) virtue as a means to shedding light on questions about epistemic status can be traced 
back to Sosa (1991a) and Zagzebski (1996). Notable recent contributions include Sosa (2007, 2009, 2011), Greco 
(2010), and Baehr (2011). 
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namely the one involved in testimonial knowledge had on account of deferring to the word of others. To 
get started, consider what should be an uncontroversial case of knowledge on the basis of such deference: 
 
(DEFERENCE) Larry is motivated to believe the truth out of a desire for truth as such. As a result, 
when Larry’s fellow inquirers tell him that p, he carefully vets them for signs of untrustworthiness. 
Having failed to discover any such signs, Larry believes that p. Larry’s fellow inquirers are reliable 
testifiers, both in the actual world and in all nearby worlds, on the matters that he consults them on.2 
 
If there are any cases of knowledge through deference, this is surely one of them. Indeed, any virtue epis-
temological theory that does not have Larry’s belief that p come out as an instance of knowledge, would 
seem to be one that we have good reason to reject—at least if we assume the following: 
 
Universality: Virtue epistemological theory is universal, in that it should be able to account for all in-
stances of knowledge.3 
 
Universality might seem a strong assumption. Still, it captures fairly well the ambition of many virtue 
epistemologists. As we shall see in Section 1.1, two important pieces of evidence to this effect are as fol-
lows. First, many virtue epistemologists are explicitly in the business of accounting for knowledge. 
Second, among those virtue epistemologists, the two most popular strategies for handling cases of 
knowledge that do not seem to fit certain conceptions of virtue—particularly conceptions requiring that 
possessors of virtue are appropriately motivated—involve arguing either that (a) those cases under closer 
scrutiny do fit the relevant conception, or that (b) there are several kinds of virtue, one of which can ac-
commodate the problematic cases of knowledge. Had the relevant epistemologists not accepted 
universality, we should expect to have seen a third strategy in response to the problematic cases, consist-
ing simply in a denial that all instances of knowledge need to be accounted for in terms of epistemic 
virtue. But that is not what we are seeing. 
                                                     
2
 Reliability is a matter of generating a high truth-to-falsity ratio, and is usually spelled out in terms of ratios of true 
to false beliefs. Notice, however, that DEFERENCE is formulated in terms of reliable testifiers—i.e., testifiers gen-
erating a high ratio of true to false statements—rather than reliable believers, in order to account for the fact that 
someone might be (a) a reliable believer but an unreliable testifier, on account of an inability or (in the case of de-
ception) unwillingness to communicate what she believes, or (b) an unreliable believer but a reliable testifier, as in 
the case of Jennifer Lackey’s creationist teacher (see Lackey, 2008: 48). 
3
 I will remain neutral on the question of whether the universality thesis should be extended to other epistemic no-
tions, such as justification, understanding, wisdom, and rationality. 
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The present paper has two goals. First, by progressively stripping DEFERENCE of putatively neces-
sary conditions for knowledge, part 1 argues that anyone who accepts that Larry possesses an epistemic 
virtue in DEFERENCE—which, given widespread acceptance of universality together with the fact that 
Larry’s testimonial beliefs clearly amount to knowledge in DEFERENCE, should include many virtue 
epistemologist—also has to accept that Larry is instantiating an epistemic virtue in the following scenario: 
 
(BLIND DEFERENCE) When Larry’s fellow inquirers tell him that p, Larry believes that p. In fact, 
Larry believes absolutely everything that he hears. He is a veritable doxastic sponge, soaking up eve-
rything he is told without any hesitation. Larry’s fellow inquirers are reliable testifiers, both in the ac-
actual world an in all nearby worlds, on the matters that he consults them on. 
 
As for the paper’s second goal, part 2 argues that, in order to account for the epistemic virtue possessed 
by Larry in BLIND DEFERENCE, we need to reject a widespread commitment to personalism, i.e., the 
idea that all epistemic virtues are personal virtues, or virtues possessed primarily on account of features 
internal to the psychology of the person. More specifically, we need to leave conceptual room for social 
virtues. Social virtues are not possessed primarily on account of features internal to the psychology of the 
person, but in whole or in large part on account of her being embedded in a reliable social environment. 
 
 
PART 1. FROM DEFERENCE TO BLIND DEFERENCE 
1.1 Deference and Motivation 
What is it to have epistemic virtue? Several virtue epistemologists take it that epistemic virtue requires an 
epistemic motivation on the part of the possessor of virtue. For example, Jason Baehr suggests that ‘an 
intellectual virtue is a character trait that contributes to its possessor’s personal intellectual worth on ac-
count of its involving a positive psychological orientation toward epistemic goods’, where the relevant 
orientation consists in ‘a concern with intellectual values or disvalues as such or considered in their own 
right’.4 Similarly, Linda Zagzebski suggests that a virtue requires ‘a characteristic motivation to produce a 
certain desired end’, and that all epistemic virtues are based in a motivation for ‘cognitive contact with 
reality’.5 According to Zagzebski, one way to be motivated thus is to be motivated by a love of truth or an 
aversion to falsehood, and that being motivated thus is intrinsically valuable, and thereby makes for ‘a 
                                                     
4
 Baehr (2011: 102 and 101, respectively). 
5
 Zagzebski (1996: 137 and 167, respectively). 
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kind of value that is capable of conferring additional value on the acts that it motivates’,6 provided that 
the motivation is grounded in a love of truth or aversion to falsehood as such.
7
 For example, someone 
who shuns false beliefs simply because believing falsely might give her a bad reputation in her epistemic 
community is not motivated by an aversion to falsehood as such. 
The relevant kind of motivation is present in DEFERENCE. Larry is motivated to believe the truth 
out of a desire for truth as such. But we might worry that the relevant kind of motivation will not be pre-
sent in other cases in which we nevertheless are hesitant to withhold an ascription of knowledge. For 
example, it seems perfectly possible to know something on the basis of reliable perceptual faculties with-
out being in any relevant sense motivated to believe truly or to be in ‘cognitive contact with reality’. One 
way to respond to this worry would be to reject universality. Some virtue epistemologists do indeed reject 
universality because they deny that their virtue epistemology is in the business of shedding light on tradi-
tional epistemic categories like knowledge.8 But many virtue epistemologists take themselves to be in 
exactly that business, and it is with these virtue epistemologists that I will be concerned in what follows.9 
Moreover, insofar as they also take motivation to be necessary for virtue, they have tended to opt for ei-
ther of two strategies in response to the problem posed by perceptual knowledge. 
The first strategy involves maintaining that the relevant kind of motivation is present in perceptual 
cases. For example, Zagzebski suggests that the relevant cases involve an intellectual attitude in the form 
of a ‘presumption for truth’.10 The nature of the relevant attitude is fairly undemanding: it can be mani-
fested by intellectually mediocre agents, as well as by young children and possibly also by animals. In 
fact, Zagzebski suggests that failing to manifest the relevant attitude would amount to a form of intellec-
tual paranoia. While lowering the bar for the relevant kind of motivation thus makes possible its presence 
even in simple perceptual processing, it retains very little of what might have seemed attractive about the 
motivation requirement in the first place. As Baehr points out, ‘[c]haracter virtues […] are typically 
thought to pick out a rather high and distinguished level of personal excellence—something that is not 
exhibited by the average cognitive agent or by young children (and certainly not by animals!)’, which is 
why Zagzebski’s response, according to Baehr, ‘appears unpromising’.11 
                                                     
6
 Zagzebski (2003: 147). 
7
 See Zagzebski (2003: 148). 
8
 See, e.g., Roberts and Wood (2007) and Kvanvig (1992). 
9
 I have in mind, primarily, Sosa (1991a, 1991b, 2007, 2009, 2011), Zagzebski (1996), Greco (2010), and Baehr 
(2011). The case of Baehr is less straightforward, but see footnote 17 for the rationale for including him here. 
10
 See Zagzebski (1996: 280). 
11
 Baehr (2011: 42). 
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This brings us to the second and recently more popular strategy for the virtue epistemologist attracted 
to the idea of motivation as necessary for epistemic virtue: bifurcate epistemic virtue. For example, 
Heather Battaly proposes that the distinction between virtue epistemologists who impose a motivation 
condition on virtue, and those who do not, suggests that there are ‘different sorts of intellectual virtues, 
which ties to different sorts of knowledge’, namely what she refers to as ‘high-grade’ and ‘low-grade’ 
knowledge.12 Similarly, while Baehr suggests that, ‘a fully or broadly virtuous person can […] be counted 
on to care deeply about ends like truth, knowledge, evidence, rationality, and understanding’,13 but does 
not need to be reliable,14 he also acknowledges that ‘some knowledge is acquired independently of any 
virtuous motives or actions at all’15 and that ‘a trait’s being epistemically reliable […] is sufficient for its 
counting as an intellectual virtue in an alternative but also legitimate and pretheoretical sense’.16 
For present purposes, I am not interested in the question of whether such a distinction in virtue is war-
ranted. What I am interested in is the dialectical fact that neither of the two theoretical moves made in 
relation to the challenge posed by perceptual knowledge involves giving up on universality.17 Indeed, 
many virtue epistemologists seem so inclined to account for the variety of ways in which we can know 
things that, in light of the failure to locate a motivational component in all instances of knowledge, they 
prefer postulating a variety of kinds of virtues to giving up on universality. This also suggests that many 
virtue epistemologists—including epistemologists who take motivation to be a necessary condition on 
(one kind of) virtue—would have to accept that Larry can be taken to possess an epistemic virtue in the 
following scenario: 
 
                                                     
12
 Battaly (2012: 17). 
13
 Baehr (2011: 2). 
14
 See Baehr (2011: 123). 
15
 Baehr (2011: 44). 
16
 Baehr (2011: 135). See also Baehr (2011: 124). 
17
 Baehr (2011) might appear to pose an exception. Baehr rejects what he refers to as strong conservative virtue 
epistemology, i.e., the kind of virtue epistemology that takes epistemic or intellectual virtue to play a fundamental 
role within traditional epistemology. But what Baehr is denying is that character virtue, i.e., the kind of virtue ac-
companied by epistemic motivations, can be expected to play a central and important role in the analysis of 
knowledge (44-6). Since Baehr grants that there is a fully legitimate reliabilist notion of virtue (124), which does not 
require any epistemic motivation for its exercise, rejecting the idea that character virtues are to play a central and 
fundamental role in answering traditional epistemological questions in the analysis of knowledge, falls short of 
denying that a virtue epistemology acknowledging a wider set of virtues should be able to account for all instances 
of knowledge. 
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(NON-MOTIVATED DEFERENCE) When Larry’s fellow inquirers tell him that p, he carefully vets 
them for signs of untrustworthiness. Having failed to discover any such signs, Larry believes that p. 
Larry’s fellow inquirers are reliable testifiers, both in the actual world and in all nearby worlds, on the 
matters that he consults them on. 
 
In this scenario, we can imagine that Larry vets his fellow inquirers for any number of non-epistemic 
reasons. For example, we can imagine that he does so, not because he cares about truth as such, but be-
cause he doesn’t want to be made a fool of. Hence, we here have a case of epistemically non-motivated 
deference, in the sense of a case wherein the deferring subject is not motivated to attain true belief, or 
cognitive contact with reality, out of a desire for those things as such. And as we have seen, several virtue 
epistemologists accept the idea that there is a kind of virtue that can be had in the absence of such motiva-
tion, given their commitment to universality together with the failure to locate a sufficiently robust 
motivational component in every case of knowledge. That is why Larry can be said to possess a kind of 
epistemic virtue in NON-MOTIVATED DEFERENCE, even by the lights of those who maintain that a 
motivation to attain true belief as such is necessary for another kind of virtue. 
 
1.2 Deference and Gullibility 
In NON-MOTIVATED DEFERENCE, Larry carefully vets his fellow inquirers for untrustworthiness 
before believing what they tell him. Why is that a good thing? Because it suggests that he is not gullible, 
to borrow a term from Elizabeth Fricker. According to Fricker, ‘the hearer should always engage in some 
assessment of the speaker for trustworthiness. To believe without doing so is to believe blindly, uncriti-
cally. This is gullibility’.18 When pressed by Sanford Goldberg and David Henderson on the issue of what 
exactly gullibility amounts to, Fricker suggests that someone is gullible ‘if she has a disposition or policy 
for doxastic response to testimony which fails to screen out false testimony’.19 She moreover claims that 
this corresponds to an interpretation suggested by Goldberg and Henderson on which someone is gullible 
if she, ‘in circumstances C, is disposed to acquire a good deal of unreliable (unsafe; insensitive; etc.) tes-
timony-based belief’.20 
This tells us two important things about gullibility. First, it is situation specific. That is, a doxastic 
disposition might make for gullibility in one set of circumstances, but not in another. Second, what de-
termines whether or not someone is gullible in any given situation is whether her doxastic dispositions are 
unreliable, unsafe, insensitive, or the like. A doxastic disposition is reliable to the extent that it tends to 
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 Fricker (1994: 145). 
19
 Fricker (2006: 620). 
20
 Goldberg and Henderson (2006: 602). 
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generate a high ratio of true to false beliefs; safe to the extent that, were it to issue in a belief that p in 
nearby possible worlds, p would (most likely) not be false; and sensitive to the extent that, if p were false, 
then the disposition would (most likely) not issue in a belief that p. For present purposes, we may follow 
the majority of epistemologists in taking reliability to be necessary for justification, and being open to the 
idea that safety might be necessary for knowledge.21  
Consider, first, the relationship between gullibility and reliability. It is not hard to imagine cases in 
which deferring to people without first vetting them for trustworthiness will lead one astray epistemically, 
on account of insincerity or incompetence on the part of one’s sources. However, remember that Larry’s 
fellow inquirers are reliable testifiers—i.e., they tend to speak the truth—on the matters on which he is 
consulting them. This means that, even if Larry were disposed to simply believe what they told him, 
without first vetting them for signs of untrustworthiness, he would not thereby be any less reliable. So, if 
gullibility is a matter of acquiring beliefs in an unreliable fashion, Larry is not gullible for failing to vet 
his fellow inquirers for untrustworthiness. Moreover, since Larry’s fellow inquirers are reliable testifiers 
not only in the actual world but also in all nearby worlds—we might say that their reliability is modally 
robust—it follows that Larry will form beliefs in a way that is not only reliable but also safe. After all, 
were Larry’s disposition to believe whatever his sources tell him to issue in beliefs in a nearby possible 
world, he would be unlikely to form false beliefs, given that his sources are reliable in all nearby possible 
worlds. In other words, as far as gullibility is concerned, there is no difference between NON-
MOTIVATED DEFERENCE and the following case: 
 
(RELIABLE DEFERENCE) When Larry’s fellow inquirers tell him that p, Larry believes that p, 
without first vetting them for signs of untrustworthiness. Larry’s fellow inquirers are reliable testifi-
ers, both in the actual world and in all nearby possible worlds, on the matters that he consults them 
on. 
 
But if that’s so, then Fricker is wrong; it is not the case that ‘the hearer should always engage in some 
assessment of the speaker for trustworthiness’22—at least not if Fricker means to say that failing to do so 
rules out one’s testimonial beliefs qualifying as knowledge. If what was just argued is correct, performing 
                                                     
21
 This is in line with the fact that few (if any) epistemologists today embrace a sensitivity condition on knowledge, 
although see Nozick (1981) for a classic defense. See also Sosa (1999) for a critique of the idea that knowledge re-
quires sensitivity, and a defense of a safety condition on knowledge. Another defense of safety can be found in 
Pritchard (2005). More recently, Sosa (2007) has denied that safety is necessary for knowledge, at least in the sense 
of animal knowledge, i.e., roughly, true belief formed by way of a reliable competence. 
22
 Fricker (1994: 145). 
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such an assessment is not necessary for testimonial knowledge, nor consequently for whatever kind of 
epistemic virtue is involved in knowing on the basis of deference. 
 
1.3 Deference and Positive Reasons 
We might worry that someone who defers to people without having attained any reasons for thinking that 
they are in fact reliable testifiers—be it by vetting them for untrustworthiness or otherwise—is not so 
much gullible as irrational. This much has been suggested by Jennifer Lackey.23 Lackey makes her point 
in terms of an example suggested by Fricker, in which a person receives reliable testimony over the Inter-
net, while lacking any relevant epistemic information about the source of that information.24 In fact, 
RELIABLE DEFERENCE can easily be re-imagined along these lines. We can imagine that the only way 
in which Larry communicates with his fellow inquirers in RELIABLE DEFERENCE is through the In-
ternet, and that he moreover has no information whatsoever about their epistemic credentials on the 
relevant matters. As it happens, however, they are highly reliable on these matters, in the modally robust 
manner outlined above. Still, Lackey would say that it would be irrational for Larry to trust his fellow 
inquirers in this kind of situation. But is that the right thing to say here? To answer this question, we need 
to consider what it is for someone to be irrational in the relevant sense. 
The term ‘irrational’ is sometimes applied to actions, and specifically to actions that are detrimental 
to the actor’s ends. That, however, is not the notion relevant here, as we—Lackey included—are interest-
ed in irrationality in an epistemic (or theoretical) rather than in a practical sense. A better candidate is 
therefore epistemic irrationality as doxastic inconsistency. However, since the case imagined does not 
involve Larry believing any contradiction, that notion of irrationality cannot be the one relevant here ei-
ther. A third candidate notion identifies epistemic irrationality with what it is reasonable for the agent to 
believe, given her evidence. The problem with invoking this notion, however, is that it amounts to simply 
restating the original demand for positive reasons, as follows: As far as Larry’s (non-existent) evidence is 
concerned, he lacks any reason to consider his source reliable. But this observation goes no lengths what-
soever towards answering the question relevant here, namely: Why should we take the absence of such 
reasons to indicate any irrationality on his part in the first place? 
One possible answer is that there is something epistemically blameworthy about trusting sources 
when one lacks any positive reasons for thinking them reliable. In other words, on this answer, we spell 
out the reasonableness of believing on one’s evidence in epistemically deontological terms. The relevant 
                                                     
23
 See Lackey (2008). 
24
 See Lackey (2008: 170, fn. 32) and Fricker (2002). Lackey also discusses a case involving someone encountering 
an alien diary. However, I will address her concerns in terms of the Internet case, since it maps more neatly onto 
RELIABLE DEFERENCE. 
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target of blame in Lackey’s example is the subject’s acceptance of the relevant reports,25 where I take it 
that the relevant kind of acceptance involves the subject believing what is reported. However, we can only 
be blamed for what is up to us, and belief-formation is not up to us—belief formation is something that 
happens to us rather than something that we do—given the truth of doxastic involuntarism, so that cannot 
be it either.26 
Another possible answer grants the above point about epistemic blameworthiness, but calls attention 
to the fact that there is still something epistemically good about rationality as a matter of believing on the 
basis of one’s evidence. This answer calls our attention to the possibility of rationality being related to our 
epistemic goals in either of two ways. On the one hand, rationality might be related to our epistemic goals 
instrumentally. In that case, however, our pursuit of rationality should fall in line with our pursuit of truth, 
with the consequence that Larry is not irrational for trusting his sources, since they are reliable. On the 
other hand, rationality might be taken to be an epistemic goal in its own right. If so, it might be that Larry 
is irrational when believing on the basis of the online communications from his fellow inquirers in the 
sense that, while doing so might promote his reliability, it fails to promote some separate, sui generis goal 
of rationality. As I have argued elsewhere, however, it is not clear that we have reason to assume any ep-
istemic goals beyond the dual goal of believing truly and not believing falsely.27 
Any lingering feeling that Larry still is irrational needs to be accounted for, of course. Just like trust 
without vetting might in some—indeed, perhaps in many—cases lead to false belief, so might belief in 
the absence of any positive reasons for thinking one’s sources trustworthy. Consequently, it should come 
as no surprise that pondering cases wherein agents have neither vetted their sources nor otherwise ac-
quired any positive reasons to take them to be reliable testifiers will raise certain red flags. The problem 
as far as epistemological theorizing is concerned, however, is that of promoting this empirical hypothesis 
about what might often be the case to a conceptual necessity, and in effect maintaining that one cannot 
know things on the basis of someone’s testimony without having vetted her for trustworthiness, or in any 
other way attained positive reasons to believe her to be reliable. If what has been argued above about ra-
tionality is on point, such a promotion should be resisted. 
 
1.4 Deference and Credit 
What we are trying to determine is whether Larry can be said to have testimonial knowledge in RELIA-
BLE DEFERENCE. What we have seen so far is that he can not be said to lack such knowledge on 
account of not being motivated to believe truly as such (Section 1.1), failing to vet his fellow inquirers for 
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 See Lackey (2008: 170). 
26
 See, e.g., Alston (2005) and Nottelmann (2006). 
27
 See Ahlstrom-Vij (2013).  
Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 
 
10 
trustworthiness (Section 1.2), or not having positive reasons to believe that those deferred to are reliable 
sources (Section 1.3). Assuming that Larry knows in DEFERENCE, and given that the elements removed 
from DEFERENCE in the previous sections have turned out not to be necessary conditions for testimonial 
knowledge, Larry also knows in RELIABLE DEFERENCE. Moreover, if all instances of knowledge are 
to be explained in terms of epistemic virtue, as per universality, then it follows that motivation, vetting, 
and positive reasons are not necessary conditions on knowing through epistemic virtue. 
What is necessary for having testimonial knowledge on the basis of virtue, then? What has been ar-
gued in the previous sections might be taken to suggest that what matters is simply whether the agent’s 
doxastic dispositions are such that she forms beliefs in a reliable fashion. Some virtue epistemologists 
have resisted this conclusion. What matters, they argue, is not merely whether or not the agent forms be-
liefs in a reliable fashion, but also whether her so doing is in any relevant sense to her credit—and only 
when it is can the agent be said to know on the basis of virtue. For example, John Greco suggests that the 
relevant kind of credit is earned when an agent’s ‘getting it right can be put down to [her] own abilities, 
rather than to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else’.28 In that sense, ‘knowledge is a kind of 
achievement, as opposed to a merely lucky success’.29 
Does Larry deserve credit for his belief in RELIABLE DEFERENCE? If he does not, and credit is 
necessary for knowledge, then he doesn’t know. However, the idea that credit is necessary for knowledge 
is independently questionable. As pointed out by Lackey, we can imagine cases wherein someone has 
knowledge, despite not deserving credit for getting the relevant matter right. Here is one such case: 
 
Having just arrived at the train station in Chicago, Morris wishes to obtain directions to the Sears 
Tower. He looks around, approaches the first adult passer-by that he sees, and asks how to get to his 
desired destination. The passer-by, who happens to be a Chicago resident who knows the city ex-
traordinarily well, provides Morris with impeccable directions to the Sears Tower by telling him that 
it is located two blocks east of the train station. Morris unhesitatingly forms the corresponding true 
belief.30 
 
According to Lackey, ‘what explains why Morris got things right has nearly nothing of epistemic interest 
to do with him and nearly everything of epistemic interest to do with the passer-by’.31 For that reason, 
‘though it is plausible to say that Morris acquired knowledge from the passer-by, there seems to be no 
                                                     
28
 Greco (2003: 116). 
29
 Greco (2010: 12). 
30
 Lackey (2007: 352). 
31
 Lackey (2007: 352). 
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substantive sense in which Morris deserves credit for holding the true belief that he does’32 This suggests 
that credit is not a necessary condition on knowledge. 
Greco contests this claim. According to Greco, ‘testimonial knowledge requires that the believer is a 
reliable receiver of testimony’.33 If Morris knows—and Greco agrees with Lackey that he does—that 
means that ‘it is also to Morris’s credit that he forms a true belief to that effect.’34 But if the passer-by is 
doing virtually all of the epistemic work, that seems implausible. Consequently, Greco denies that the 
passer-by is doing virtually all of the epistemic work, and suggests that Morris’s ‘success is grounded in 
his ability to discriminate good from bad testimony and is therefore attributable to him’.35 But what, 
Lackey asks, is it to be able to discriminate thus?36 Consider the two most plausible readings: 
First, Greco might have in mind a requirement to the effect that Morris should be sensitive to defeat-
ers—i.e., considerations speaking against belief—and possess some positive reason for believing his 
interlocutor to be reliable. But in that case, he is in agreement with Lackey. However, as we saw in the 
previous section, having positive reasons is not a necessary condition on knowledge, and as we shall see 
in the next section, neither is being sensitive to defeaters. Consequently, if these are the things that credit 
requires, then credit isn’t necessary for knowledge. 
Second, Greco might mean something different, and more substantial by credit than a mere sensitivi-
ty to defeaters and the possession of positive reasons. His talk about the necessity of being a reliable 
receiver of testimony suggests a requirement to the effect that the receiver is able to discriminate between 
trustworthy and untrustworthy interlocutors, where someone is trustworthy to the extent that they are both 
competent and sincere, and untrustworthy otherwise. But in that case, Lackey points out, Greco would be 
committing himself to a limited form of skepticism about testimonial knowledge: 
 
Most of us […] are not very reliable at discriminating reliable testimony from unreliable testimony 
when people whom we first meet report their names, occupations, family histories, and so on. For in 
such circumstances, liars and incompetents typically fail to have identifiable marks announcing their 
deception and incompetence, and those who are honest and competent in such matters rarely can be 
picked out as such. To put this more concretely, how on earth would you be able to tell that the 
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 Lackey (2007: 352). 
33
 Greco (2010: 81). 
34
 Greco (2010: 81). 
35
 Greco (2010: 81). 
36
 See Lackey (2012: 310-312). 
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woman next to you on the airplane is lying when she tells you that her name is Amanda, or that she is 
a nurse, or that she has 3 children, or that she lives in Albuquerque?37 
 
Given the frequency with which we find ourselves in situations of the kind highlighted by Lackey, and the 
undesirability of the relevant skeptical implications, Lackey’s conclusion stands: credit is not a necessary 
condition on knowledge. 
That said, there might be a notion of credit that survives Lackey’s objections. Notice that Greco jux-
taposes credit with luck: credit is earned when an agent’s ‘getting it right can be put down to [her] own 
abilities, rather than to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else’.38 The idea that believing in a man-
ner for which one deserves credit rules out success through luck can also be found in other defenders of 
virtue accounts of knowledge. For example, Ernest Sosa maintains that ‘knowledge is true belief out of 
intellectual virtue, belief that turns out right by reason of the virtue and not just by coincidence’.39 Simi-
larly, Wayne Riggs suggests that the kind of credit due in cases of knowledge is a kind of credit that 
would not be due had the person in question ‘only accidentally happened upon a true belief’.40 Let us refer 
to this notion of credit as ‘anti-luck credit’.  
Why care about believing in a manner that rules out lucky success? As in the case of gullibility, it 
seems that there is a probabilistic and a modal element to the relevant kind of luck.41 As noted above, ac-
cording to some epistemologists, in so far as we are concerned with knowledge, we might more 
specifically be concerned with our beliefs not being true in an unreliable or unsafe manner. If p is true and 
I form a belief that p on the basis of an unreliable process, then there is a sense in which I got lucky. And 
to the extent that we do not want our beliefs to be true in an unsafe manner, we want it to be the case that, 
if I believe that p, that belief could not easily have been false, had the world just been slightly different. If 
p is true and I come to believe that p in an unsafe manner, then there, too, is a sense in which I got lucky. 
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 Lackey (2012: 312-313). 
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 Greco (2003: 116). 
39
 Sosa (1991b: 277). 
40
 Riggs (2002: 93). 
41
 The modal element of luck corresponds to what Pritchard (2005) refers to as veritic epistemic luck. Pritchard sug-
gests that there is an additional kind of luck, namely reflective epistemic luck. A person forms a belief in a 
reflectively lucky fashion if she cannot know by reflection alone that her belief is not veritically lucky. Reflective 
luck will not be discussed here, the reason being that, as Pritchard (2005: 173-177) makes clear, reflective luck is the 
kind of luck that is supposed to be ruled out by the type of virtuous conduct that virtue epistemologists like Zagzeb-
ski (1996) are concerned with. As such, reflective luck pertains to the kind of virtue set aside in relation to the 
bifurcation of virtue discussed in Section 1.1 above. 
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In other words, the kind of luck we are concerned with ruling out when understanding knowledge in 
terms of true belief for which we deserve the relevant kind of anti-luck credit is the one ruled out by relia-
ble and safe belief-formation. But on that notion of credit, there’s no worry about Larry in RELIABLE 
DEFERENCE. That scenario involves Larry forming beliefs in a reliable and safe manner, owing to the 
fact that he is deferring to sources whose reliability is modally robust. As a result, in so far as he believes 
truly, he is not thereby lucky.42 This, moreover, suggests that anti-luck credit is not an independent, nec-
essary condition on knowing on account of virtue. If the purpose of credit is to rule out luck, then credit is 
entailed by reliability and safety. Differently put, every time I form beliefs in a reliable and safe manner, 
it follows that I am not lucky and thereby can be credited for believing truly in so far as I do. That is why 
we do not need to invoke anti-luck credit as a necessary condition on testimonial knowledge, in addition 
to that of reliability and safety.43 
 
1.5 Deference and Defeaters 
Some epistemologists might still resist the conclusion that all that matters for exhibiting the kind of epis-
temic virtue relevant to testimonial knowledge is whether or not our doxastic dispositions are reliable in a 
modally robust manner. More specifically, someone might take RELIABLE DEFERENCE not to be 
spelled out in sufficient detail, in at least the following way: In order to know what his fellow inquirers 
are telling him, it is not sufficient that Larry’s sources are reliable sources in a modally robust manner, 
                                                     
42
 We might, of course, still want to say that he is lucky for finding himself among such a reliable group of people, 
and in so doing we might mean two different things. On the one hand, we might mean that he easily could have 
found himself among a significantly less reliable group of people, had the world just been slightly different. Howev-
er, since his fellow inquirers are reliable in a modally robust manner, and Larry’s testimonial beliefs thereby are 
safe, that’s not the case in RELIABLE DEFERENCE. On the other hand, we might mean that he is lucky in the 
sense that he (we can imagine) can’t take credit for finding himself among such a reliable group of people. Perhaps 
he was simply born into the relevant community. However, that cannot be the notion of ‘luck’ that credit theorists 
have in mind. Credit theorists want to be able to say that we can be credited with what we reliably believe on the 
basis of perception, memory, etc. But these are, of course, faculties we are born with, and as such not ones that we 
can take credit for having. 
43
 It might be objected to that anti-luck credit fails to account for the sense in which knowledge is an achievement 
(Greco 2010: 12). There are two problems with this objection. First, as argued by Pritchard (2005: 191-193), we can 
account for the idea that knowledge is an achievement in terms of safety, and as such also in terms of (what I have 
called) anti-luck credit. Second, the idea that knowledge is an achievement is questionable. The latter idea is typical-
ly invoked to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief (e.g., in Greco 2010). However, this 
assumes that we have reason to believe that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, which is something 
that I have argued elsewhere that we lack reason to believe (see Ahlstrom-Vij 2013). 
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and any disposition on his part to rely on their word thereby is reliable in the actual as well as in all near-
by possible worlds; in addition, Larry needs to be properly sensitive to (normative) defeaters, i.e., 
considerations that speak against forming belief, were such considerations to arise.  
To evaluate this claim, we may consider two cases discussed by Lackey. To be properly sensitive to 
defeaters, one needs to be endowed with a capacity for picking up on defeaters in the first place, whether 
or not one exercises that capacity. Lackey imagines a compulsively trusting person, Bill, who is unable to 
distrust the object of his romantic affection, Jill, to such an extent that he is ‘simply incapable of being 
sensitive to the presence of defeaters regarding her reports’.44 As a result, Lackey suggests, the beliefs Bill 
forms on the basis of Jill’s testimony are ‘evidentially insensitive in a way that is clearly incompatible 
with justification, warrant, and knowledge’.45 Lackey also considers a more general case, involving Stu-
art, who is incapable of being sensitive to the presence of defeaters with respect to anyone’s reports.46 
Lackey rightly stresses that this is not simply a matter of gullibility. A gullible person has the capacity to 
pick up on defeaters, but fails to exercise it. Stuart, however, ‘is psychologically incapable of appreciating 
counterevidence and thus he is epistemically defective in a much deeper way than the merely gullible’.47 
If Lackey is right, then Larry cannot possibly have testimonial knowledge in the following re-
imagining of RELIABLE DEFERENCE: 
 
(BLIND DEFERENCE) When Larry’s fellow inquirers tell him that p, Larry believes that p. In fact, 
Larry believes absolutely everything that he hears. He is a veritable doxastic sponge, soaking up eve-
rything he is told without any hesitation. Larry’s fellow inquirers are reliable testifiers, both in the 
actual world an in all nearby worlds, on the matters that he consults them on. 
 
If Stuart is epistemically defective in Lackey’s case, then the same goes for Larry in BLIND DEFER-
ENCE—and neither of them can have testimonial knowledge on account of believing their sources, even 
if those sources are reliable in a modally robust manner. And like in the case of Stuart, the reason that 
Larry cannot have such knowledge is that he lacks a capacity for picking up on defeaters. Which raises a 
question: Why care about that capacity? Arguably, because we care about picking up on any defeaters 
that there are in any given case. But what if we were to postulate that there are no normative defeaters in 
BLIND DEFERENCE, and consequently no normative defeaters for Larry to pick up on? In that case, it 
would seem that Larry would be picking up on any normative defeaters that there are, namely none. Ac-
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 See Lackey (2008: 160). 
47
 Lackey (2008: 161, fn. 20). 
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cording to Lackey, however, this will not do. There might be a trivial sense in which Larry thereby would 
satisfy any requirement to pick up on defeaters. That is, he will have failed to pick up on defeaters, not 
because there are none—which would amount to satisfying the requirement in a substantive sense—but 
simply because he lacks a capacity to pick up on defeaters. 
Which raises another question: Why care about substantively rather than trivially satisfying any re-
quirement on picking up on defeaters? According to Lackey, because ‘trivial satisfaction of [the condition 
on picking up on defeaters] does not indicate any sort of sensitivity on the part of the subject to evidence 
either for or against her own beliefs’ and that, ‘without a proper sensitivity to one’s epistemic surround-
ings, it is merely a lucky coincidence that one ends up satisfying [that condition]’.48 In other words, in so 
far as we require substantive satisfaction of a condition on picking up on defeaters, and consequently also 
a capacity for so doing (in order to rule out trivial satisfaction), we do so because of a concern with the 
kind of luck ruled out when sensitive to our surrounding. But this brings us right back to the points al-
ready made about luck in Section 1.4 in relation to anti-luck credit. Specifically, knowledge might require 
the absence of the kind of luck ruled out by reliability and safety. But that kind of luck is ruled out in 
BLIND DEFERENCE by the fact that Larry’s fellow inquirers are reliable in a modally robust manner. 
Consequently, if the purpose of being sensitive to defeaters is to rule out luck, then Larry’s inability to 
pick up on defeaters in BLIND DEFERENCE does not rule out him having testimonial knowledge, con-
trary to what Lackey suggests. 
 
 
PART 2. FROM BLIND DEFERENCE TO SOCIAL VIRTUE 
Let us recapitulate. The strategy of part 1 has been to progressively strip DEFERENCE of putatively nec-
essary conditions on testimonial knowledge, all the way down to BLIND DEFERENCE. If what has been 
argued so far is correct, anyone who accepts that Larry has testimonial knowledge in DEFERENCE 
should accept that he also has such knowledge in BLIND DEFERENCE. This is because, as it turns out, 
none of the conditions removed from DEFERENCE to get to BLIND DEFERENCE correspond to condi-
tions necessary for testimonial knowledge. Moreover, all virtue epistemologists who accept that Larry has 
testimonial knowledge in DEFERENCE, and who also accept universality, thereby have to accept that 
BLIND DEFERENCE involves the possession of an epistemic virtue. The burden of the remainder of the 
paper is to argue that, in order to account for the virtue involved in BLIND DEFERENCE, we need to 
abandon a commitment regarding the nature of epistemic virtue found among virtue epistemologists 
across the theoretical spectrum, and make room for what will be referred to as social virtue. 
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2.1 Personalism 
As we have seen in previous sections, different virtue theorists have different suggestions as to what a 
person needs to do or be like in order to possess epistemic virtue. At the same time, there is also a sub-
stantial commonality. The commonality, it will be suggested, is captured by the following thesis: 
 
Personalism: Epistemic virtues are personal virtues, in the sense of being possessed primarily on ac-
count of features internal to the psychology of the person. 
 
I will be providing some specific evidence regarding individual virtue epistemologists’ commitment to 
personalism in a moment. But before so doing, a few notes of clarification are in order. 
First, to ask whether a virtue is possessed primarily on account of features internal to the psychology 
of the person is to ask whether an explanation of why the person in question is virtuous will have to make 
significant reference to psychological features of the person in question. For example, as we shall see, 
when explaining why some particular person is virtuous, virtue epistemologists might make reference to 
facts about her motivations, desires, abilities, and the like. These all correspond to psychological states or 
dispositions of the person. 
Second, to say that any explanation of why some particular person is virtuous needs to make signifi-
cant reference to features internal to the psychology of the person, is not to say that no reference can be 
made to non-psychological features. For example, as we have seen, some virtue epistemologists explain 
virtue in terms of reliable intellectual abilities or dispositions. The reliability of dispositions will, in turn, 
depend on features external to the person’s psychology, such as features of her physical environment 
(e.g., normal lighting and noise levels) or her social environment (e.g., reliable and sincere informants). 
As we shall see, whether the virtue epistemologists in question are still committed to personalism will 
depend on their views on the extent to which someone’s reliability can be explained with reference to 
such external factors, as opposed to factors internal to the psychology of the person. For example, can 
someone qualify as virtuous, even if her reliability can be explained more or less completely with refer-
ence to her social environment? Someone committed to personalism is going to want to say ‘no’. 
Third, a commitment to personalism does not entail a commitment to internalism either about justifi-
cation or knowledge. Features may be internal to the psychology of the person, without that person having 
any kind of privileged access—i.e., access by way of introspection, a priori reasoning, or the like—to 
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those features.
49
 For example, Greco maintains that, for a person to know something, the relevant belief 
needs to be (i) a product of a belief-forming disposition that tends to generate true belief, as well as (ii) 
true because it’s a result of that disposition.50 As Sosa puts the point, knowledge requires not just adroit-
ness (a manifestation of skill) but also aptitude (success on account of a manifestation of skill).51 Howev-
However, the person will typically not have privileged access to such etiological facts about her beliefs, 
nor does she need to in order to know. This is not to say that personalism is incompatible with internal-
ism—the claim is simply that personalism doesn’t entail internalism. 
Having clarified personalism, we may now return to the claim made a moment ago, to the effect that 
it’s a thesis to which virtue epistemologists across the theoretical spectrum are committed. What is the 
evidence for that claim? Since no one has to my knowledge explicitly committed him- or herself to per-
sonalism, the evidence provided will be indirect. More specifically, my arguments in what follows will 
take either of two forms. In some cases (Section 2.2), I will argue that we can infer an implicit commit-
ment to personalism from explicit commitments about the nature of virtue. In the remaining cases 
(Sections 2.3-4), I will argue that we can infer such a commitment from certain responses to hypothetical 
cases—responses that could not be given in the absence of a commitment to personalism. Since my ar-
guments cannot be exhaustive, I will focus on the views of five representative virtue epistemologists—
Baehr, Zagzebski, Greco, Riggs and Sosa—under the assumption that the points made by them apply mu-
tatis mutandis to other virtue epistemologists. 
 
2.2 Zagzebski and Baehr on Personalism 
According to Baehr, inquiry often has a ‘personal source’ in that it ‘makes substantial personal demands 
on inquirers’52 in the specific sense of demanding that we exercise a range of intellectual virtues. Such 
virtues are ‘personal intellectual excellences’ that ‘plausibly bear on their possessor’s “personal worth,” 
that is, to their possessor’s goodness or badness qua person’.53 Moreover, ‘where the concern is personal 
worth, what seems relevant are certain “internal” or psychological factors, for example, what the person 
aims at, desires, or strives to achieve’.54 More specifically, intellectual virtue is ‘rooted in’ or ‘flows 
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 This corresponds to what Alston (1985) refers to as access internalism, and Greco (2010) refers to as privileged 
access internalism. 
50
 See Greco (2010). 
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 See, e.g., Sosa (2007). 
52
 Baehr (2011: 1). 
53
 Baehr (2011: 88 and 23, respectively). 
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from’55 an admirable epistemic motivation on the part of the person, on account of which ‘a fully and 
broadly virtuous person can […] be counted on to care deeply about ends like truth, knowledge, evidence, 
rationally, and understanding’.56 Indeed, Baehr maintains that ‘the primary basis of intellectual worth, and 
thus of intellectual virtue, is a positive psychological orientation or “love” of epistemic goods like 
knowledge and understanding’.57 
All of this pertains to personalism as follows: on Baehr’s picture, any explanation of why a particular 
person is virtuous is going to have to make reference to that person’s motivation, where that motivation 
moreover explains that person’s possessing the particular kind of personal worth had on account of being 
virtuous. A person’s motivation is a psychological feature. Moreover, on Baehr’s account, failing to men-
tion this feature—‘the primary basis’ of intellectual virtue, as he says—would mean failing to make clear 
why the relevant person is virtuous. Hence, it seems reasonable to say that, on Baehr’s picture, an expla-
nation of why someone is virtuous would have to make significant reference to features internal to the 
psychology of the person in question. We can thereby infer an implicit commitment to personalism from 
Baehr’s explicit commitments. 
Let us turn to Zagzebski. According to Zagzebski, ‘[a] virtue […] can be defined as a deep and endur-
ing acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired 
end, and reliable success in bringing about that end’.58 Focusing for the moment on the motivational com-
ponent, Zagzebski takes a motivation to be ‘a disposition to have a certain motive’,59 and a motive to be 
‘an emotion or feeling that initiates and directs action towards and end’.60 The motivation, moreover, is 
‘an internal property of human agents’,61 which means that the same would have to go for the disposi-
tions, emotions, and feelings that make up motivations. Motivations, dispositions, emotions, and feelings 
are all features internal to the psychology of the agent. Consequently, since any explanation of why a per-
son is virtuous will have to make significant reference to such psychological features, on Zagzebski’s 
account, she is committed to personalism. 
It might be argued that any attempt to demonstrate a commitment on the part of Zagzebski to person-
alism with reference to the motivational component of her account, will be complicated by the fact that 
she, unlike Baehr, also requires that virtuous agents be reliable in bringing about the ends they’re moti-
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vated to pursue. As noted above (Section 2.1), the reliability of a disposition will not be a function solely 
of its psychological makeup. Consequently, it might be that whether Zagzebski is committed to personal-
ism depends on whether the reliability component of her account also implies such a commitment. The 
following two sections will attempt to make plausible the claim that it does, by arguing that three virtue 
epistemologists—namely Greco, Riggs, and Sosa—who reject Zagzebski and Baehr’s motivational com-
ponent while defending a reliability component, are still committed to personalism. In that respect, the 
following sections will do double duty: they will demonstrate both that Greco, Riggs, and Sosa are com-
mitted to personalism, and that Zagzebski is, too, on account of how she would be committed to personal-
personalism, even if she were to drop her motivational component. 
In fact, the following two sections can be taken to do triple duty, by also addressing the following 
concern: Remember that Baehr (and others), while rejecting a reliability condition on character virtue,62 
accepts that there is a legitimate, reliabilist notion of epistemic virtue that does not necessarily involve a 
motivational component.63 Consequently, taking Baehr’s account of character virtue to imply a commit-
ment to personalism is not to say that Baehr accepts personalism for all virtues. In light of this concern, 
together with the double duty mentioned in the previous paragraph, let us consider the three reliabilist 
virtue epistemologists mentioned a moment ago, to see if we can reveal a commitment to personalism in 
relation to their theories as well. 
 
2.3 Greco and Riggs on Personalism 
According to Greco, virtue epistemological theories are person-based theories in that they ‘define the 
normative properties of beliefs in terms of the normative properties of persons’.64 The particular features 
of persons that Greco takes to be relevant to explaining knowledge are intellectual abilities. Intellectual 
abilities are psychological dispositions on the part of the person, such as the psychological dispositions 
involved in perceiving, remembering, or reflecting on things. When a person forms a true belief through 
an intellectual ability, she deserves credit on account of how her success ‘can be put down to [her] own 
abilities, rather than to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else’.65 Differently put, credit is earned 
when ‘an intellectual ability explains why S has a true belief’.66 The relevant kind of explanation is a 
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causal one. That is, the intellectual ability explains why the person has a true belief, because that ability is 
‘an important or salient part of the causal story’67 behind the relevant belief. 
When do intellectual abilities explain why the person formed a true belief in this manner? When the 
causally operative ability behind the relevant belief is reliable and as such tends to generate true belief. 
Virtues consist in such reliable abilities. In that respect, Greco’s account ‘makes agent reliability an im-
portant condition on epistemic normativity’.68 In other words, the relevant kind of explanation goes 
something like this: In cases of knowledge, the belief involved is or has been causally formed through a 
reliable intellectual ability—i.e., a virtue—and the reliability of that ability is what explains why a true 
belief was formed rather than a false one, and the agent possessing that ability thereby also deserves credit 
for getting it right. In other words, what accounts for knowledge is ultimately the possession of a virtue, 
which in turn consists in (a) the having of an ability, understood as a psychological disposition, and (b) 
that ability being reliable, and as such being able to (causally) explain success in the form of true belief. 
As we have seen, Riggs, too, defends a credit theory of knowledge. According to Riggs, credit is a 
matter of attributability, as contrasted with luck: ‘To say that something is due to luck just is to say that it 
is not attributable to whomever is assumed to be the beneficiary (or victim) of said luck. “Credit,” then, is 
simply shorthand for saying that some event, state of affairs, or consequence thereof is attributable to an 
agent, as an agent’.69 What exactly is required for the relevant kind of attributability? Riggs is sceptical 
about Greco’s requirement of causal saliency on the grounds that ‘it seems to explain the obscure by the 
obscure’.70 Still, I will discuss Riggs’s theory in terms of that requirement. For one thing, Riggs claims 
both ‘that the causal prominence of one’s cognitive abilities is an important measure of the degree to 
which your having arrived at a true belief is attributable to you as a cognitive agent’ and that ‘the salience 
requirement does provide a handy way to determine in particular cases whether that causal prominence is 
sufficient for attribution or not’.71 For another, Riggs doesn’t spell out an alternative way to determine 
attributability, which leaves us with what he himself acknowledges to be the important measure provided 
by causal prominence and saliency. In light of this, I will assume that Riggs, too, takes it that virtue pos-
session consists in (a) the having of an ability, understood as a psychological disposition, and (b) that 
ability being reliable, and as such being able to (causally) explain success in the form of true belief.  
If personalism is true, both (a) and (b) have to be accounted for with significant reference to features 
internal to the psychology of the person. This requirement is straightforwardly satisfied in the case of (a), 
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since intellectual abilities are psychological dispositions. But what about (b)? Whether or not our abilities 
are reliable is not going to be a function simply of their psychological structure, but also (among other 
things) of the extent to which that structure ‘fits’ with our social environment. For example, a disposition 
to trust people is not reliable in a situation where a great majority of people are insincere, incompetent, or 
both. Still, if personalism is true, any account of why some particular ability or disposition is reliable has 
to make significant, albeit not necessarily exclusive, reference to features internal to the psychology of the 
person, such as the nature of that disposition and sensitivities manifested by the person on account of pos-
sessing the relevant disposition. 
What does it mean to make significant reference to features internal to the psychology of the person 
when explaining why some particular disposition or ability is reliable? In answering this question, we 
may return to Lackey’s case involving Morris, as discussed in Section 1.4. As we saw, Lackey takes it 
that Morris knows, but doesn’t deserve credit for knowing, and that credit therefore cannot be a necessary 
condition on knowledge. As she put it, ‘what explains why Morris got things right has nearly nothing of 
epistemic interest to do with him and nearly everything of epistemic interest to do with the passer-by’.72 It 
should be noted that this is not incompatible with Morris possessing and maybe even manifesting some 
intellectual ability in the relevant situation, even if that ability only is whatever minimal ability is in-
volved in taking on board testimonial input. In so far as we want to say that Morris knows where the Sears 
Tower is located, however, and moreover want to account for that knowledge in terms of epistemic vir-
tues (which we would have to do, if committed to universalism), Lackey’s take on his situation is 
incompatible with personalism. While Morris’s (minimal) ability can be accounted for with exclusive ref-
erence to psychological factors, the fact that that ability enables him to form a true belief in the relevant 
scenario cannot. Any account of the latter would have to make significant reference, not to some psycho-
logical feature of Morris, but to his surrounding, and to features of the passer-by in particular. 
Or consider the matter from the opposite side: if we reject personalism, then there would be nothing 
to rule out the following possibility: Morris possesses the relevant minimal ability, Chicago happens to 
contain a great many sincere and geographically competent people, and his ability is thereby not only his 
ability, but also a reliable ability which, on that account, would qualify as a virtue. If Morris moreover 
forms his geographical beliefs by way of that ability, then Greco and Riggs would have to say that he de-
serves credit for getting it right, and can as such be said to know. Consequently, we should expect any 
virtue epistemologist accepting personalism to either deny that Morris knows, or claim that, contrary to 
what Lackey is suggesting, any account of why Morris formed a true belief makes significant mention of 
an intellectual ability on his part, the reliability of which depends to a non-trivial extent on psychological 
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facts about Morris, and not more or less exclusively on his social environment. And, as it happens, these 
two responses correspond exactly to the responses that Riggs and Greco give, respectively. 
We saw Greco’s response already in Section 1.4: Morris’s ‘success is grounded in his ability to dis-
criminate good from bad testimony and is therefore attributable to him’.73 We noted that the two most 
plausible ways to cash out the relevant ability failed to support the idea that credit is necessary for 
knowledge. At this point, however, we are interested, not in the plausibility of a credit condition on 
knowledge, but in the fact that Greco’s response provides evidence of him being committed to personal-
ism. This is so on account of how Greco’s response suggests that he holds that any account of why Morris 
knows (if he does), and as such manifests virtue, would need to make significant reference to psychologi-
cal facts about Morris, and in particular to facts about how he will be prone to look out for as well as pick 
up on certain testimonial cues relating to sincerity and competence, and moreover have his belief-
formation be influenced by what those cues are telling him about the caliber of his testimonial sources. 
Riggs, unlike Greco, is sceptical about the claim that Morris knows.74 That said, Riggs’s reasons for 
scepticism are very similar to Greco’s reasons for spelling out the case as one involving a discriminatory 
capacity on the part of Morris. Riggs writes:  
 
You acquire testimonial knowledge when you acquire a true belief that is attributable to you. The 
truth of your testimonial belief will not be attributable to you unless you exercised the relevant ability 
when acquiring it, and this will not be the case unless you did all the things that constitute exercising 
that ability (watch for signs of insincerity, check information against background beliefs, etc.).75  
 
Indeed, Riggs suggests that there are two discriminatory capabilities relevant to the case of Morris: 
‘Whether or not Morris’s coming to have a true belief via testimony is attributable to him depends not 
merely upon how good he is at choosing people to approach, but also on how discriminating he is about 
what he believes from such people’.76 Consequently, any account of why Morris knows (assuming that he 
does), and as such manifests virtue, would need to make significant reference to facts about Morris’ psy-
chology, and in particular to his tendency to look for signs for insincerity, to be sensitive to those signs, 
and to bring background information, encoded in memory, to bear on questions both regarding whom to 
talk to and whom to trust. 
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As noted a moment ago, these are exactly the kind of responses we should expect from virtue epis-
temologists accepting personalism.
77
 By contrast, were Greco and Riggs not committed to personalism, 
it’s not clear that they would’ve been able to rule out the kind of scenario they seem so keen on ruling out, 
namely one in which Morris deserves credit, despite it being that case that ‘what explains why Morris got 
things right has nearly nothing of epistemic interest to do with him and nearly everything of epistemic 
interest to do with the passerby’, as Lackey puts it.78 As noted above, in the absence of a commitment to 
personalism, we can ascribe to Morris a minimal ability to take on board testimonial information, and 
then maintain that Morris knows on account of an ability that’s reliable owing, not to any substantive fact 
about the psychology of Morris, but more or less exclusively to the sincerity and competence of the peo-
ple he happens to encounter. In other words, given that Greco and Riggs not only give exactly the kind of 
responses to the Morris case that we should expect from someone accepting personalism, but also would 
be unable to give those responses if they rejected personalism, we have good reason to believe that 
they’re committed to personalism. 
 
2.4 Sosa on Personalism 
Like Greco and Riggs, Sosa identifies epistemic virtues with competencies or abilities, in turn constitut-
ing psychological dispositions.79 When manifested in the formation of true beliefs, these abilities or 
dispositions causally80 explain why someone knows, and thereby deserves credit for believing truly. More 
specifically, Sosa takes knowledge81 to require aptness, which in turn ‘requires the manifestation of a 
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 Sosa distinguishes between animal knowledge, reflective knowledge, and the kind of knowledge involved in 
‘knowing full well’. Here, I am focusing on animal knowledge, i.e., apt belief, since what can be said about such 
knowledge with respect to personalism extends to the other two kinds. In the case of reflective knowledge, which is 
‘apt belief that the subject aptly believes to be apt’ (2007: 24), what holds for aptness in terms of features attributa-
ble to the person will hold for second-order aptness, too. Knowing full well involves animal and reflective 
knowledge, as well as a meta-competence for risk assessment that ‘governs whether or not one should form a belief 
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competence, [where] a competence is a disposition, one with a basis resident in the competent agent, one 
that would in appropriately normal conditions ensure (or make highly likely) the success of the any rele-
vant performance issued by it’.82 However, Sosa also maintains that manifesting such a competence is 
insufficient for knowledge: ‘In believing one might or might not be endeavoring to attain truth. Believ-
ings whereby one is not so endeavoring cannot constitute knowledge’.83 Sosa makes clear that such 
endeavoring doesn’t have to involve consciously aiming at something,84 but simply involves a desire for 
truth.85 In contrast with Baehr and Zagzebski, however, Sosa doesn’t seem to take the relevant kind of 
desire to be a condition on epistemic virtue—i.e., on possessing the relevant kind of intellectual ability—
which is why the relevant type of desire will be ignored in what follows.86 
Let us focus, instead, on the fact that Sosa takes the reliability of a competence under appropriately 
normal conditions to be a necessary and sufficient condition on it amounting to a virtue. As we saw in the 
previous section, defining virtues in terms of reliability does not necessarily amount to rejecting personal-
ism—at least not on account of acknowledging that explaining why some particular ability is reliable 
might in some cases need to make reference to the person’s social environment, for example in testimoni-
al contexts. Accepting personalism simply rules out explanations of virtue that more or less exclusively 
account for reliability in terms of social factors. Greco and Riggs seem to hold that such explanations are 
ruled out. Moreover, it is not clear that they would be able to do that if they rejected personalism. This 
was taken as evidence of a commitment to personalism. 
Sosa’s formulation of the relevant reliability condition calls attention to another type of factor, the 
acknowledgement of which stands in potential conflict with personalism: external, physical conditions. 
Just like explanations of the reliability of intellectual abilities sometimes cannot be made without refer-
ence to one’s social environment, such explanations can rarely be made without reference to external, 
physical conditions, including to conditions being suitably normal for the ability’s exercise. Does this ob-
servation make for a conflict with personalism? In analogy with what was said about social environments 
in the previous section, it does if it is ever the case that the reliability of some ability, and thereby also its 
                                                                                                                                                                           
that beliefs that amount to knowing full well are more creditable than those we simply believe aptly, what holds for 
apt belief with respect to any personalist requirement about accounting for virtue with reference to features internal 
to the psychology of the person holds, if anything, to an even greater extent for knowing full well. 
82
 Sosa (2007: 29). 
83
 Sosa (2011: 15). 
84
 Sosa (2011: 16). 
85
 Sosa (2011: 25). 
86
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status as a virtue, can be explained more or less exclusively with reference to external conditions, and vir-
tually without any mention of features internal to the psychology of the person possessing the relevant 
ability. Consequently, someone committed to personalism would want to deny that possibility. 
Where does Sosa stand on the matter? At one point, when discussing the matter of credit, Sosa makes 
an analogy that speaks to the kind of possibility just mentioned: 
 
[C]redit can depend on the cooperation of appropriate external conditions, since the manifestation of 
the competence can depend on contingent externalities. Thus, if an archer shoots a metal-tipped ar-
row, and the target is a super-powerful magnet, he would earn minimal credit at most for his 
successful shot. Suppose any shot, in any direction, anywhere near that target would end up in the 
bull’s eye.87 
 
Large parts of Sosa’s recent work on epistemic virtue relies on an analogy between the skill involved in 
activities like archery and that involved in virtuous belief-formation. As Greco and Turri put it, for Sosa, 
‘[b]elief-formation is a psychological performance with an aim’.88 While questions can be raised about 
this analogy, since archery involves a degree (and maybe even kind) of voluntary control that seems ab-
sent in the case of belief-formation, given doxastic involuntarism, I will not press this point here. Instead, 
I will grant Sosa the analogy, and simply assume that what he says about archery also goes for belief-
formation. (This is, of course, exactly the assumption he wants us to make when repeatedly relying on the 
relevant analogy.) 
Before looking more closely at what Sosa is saying in the passage quoted above, consider what some-
one accepting the relevant analogy but rejecting personalism might have said about the relevant scenario. 
She might have said that the archer possesses some minimal ability enabling her to shoot the bow but 
nothing more. Then, she might have suggested that such an ability amounts to a virtue under the relevant 
circumstances, on account of being an ability possessed by the person that moreover enables her to relia-
bly hit the bull’s eye. Of course, any explanation of why that ability is reliable, and as such amounts to a 
virtue, will make very little reference to features internal to the person—in the archery case, features per-
taining to her physiology perhaps, and in the analogous, epistemic case, to her psychology. Instead, its 
reliability will be accounted for more or less completely in terms of the metal-tipped arrow and the pow-
erful magnet, both of which are features external to the person. Still, the mere fact that the explanation for 
the ability’s reliability makes significant reference to such external factors does not take away from the 
fact that, if credit is given to those who succeed through the exercise of reliable abilities, as per what Sosa 
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suggests, and the person in question exercises that ability (adroitness) and hits the bull’s eye on account 
of that exercise (aptness), then she deserves credit. 
 That’s not what Sosa says in the passage quoted above, of course, and the reader might here be in-
clined to side with Sosa over our imagined critic of personalism. After all, how on earth can the person in 
the magnet scenario deserve any credit for hitting the bull’s eye? That’s a valid question—but notice that 
the question gets exactly to the matter of whether Sosa is committed to personalism or not. Knowledge, 
according to Sosa, is a matter of aptness, i.e., success through reliable ability. What the previous para-
graph shows is that, if we reject personalism, and thereby accept that something can constitute a virtue 
more or less completely on account of external conditions, then there’s nothing that rules out the conclu-
sion that the person in the relevant scenario succeeds through reliable ability, and as such manifests 
virtue. There is a way to rule out that conclusion, of course. The way to rule it out is to commit to what I 
would thereby like to suggest that Sosa is implicitly committing himself to, namely personalism. After all, 
if personalism is true, abilities the reliability of which can only be accounted for by making more or less 
exclusive reference to features external to the person cannot constitute virtues. In the absence of virtue, 
there is no knowledge, nor consequently any, or at most very minimal, credit—which of course is exactly 
what Sosa suggests. 
It might be objected that Sosa’s concern in the case imagined is not so much that success in the case 
imagined would have to be explained with reference to features external to the agent, as that the condi-
tions aren’t appropriately normal: ‘The success of an archer’s shot is creditable, attributable to the 
exercise of a competence, only if the external conditions are appropriate for the manifestation of the com-
petence, and this would include appropriate wind conditions, absence of powerful magnets, et cetera.’89 
Talking about conditions not being appropriate makes sense in the case of unfavourable conditions, as 
when strong winds and low visibility makes it virtually impossible for an archer to hit the bull’s-eye. But 
it’s harder to make sense of talk of conditions not being appropriate in the case of highly favourable con-
ditions. After all, in the case where the agent possesses a minimal skill to shoot the bow and nothing 
more, and reliably hits the bull’s-eye on account of the metal-tipped arrows and the powerful magnet, the 
external conditions are appropriate, in that the archer is highly likely to hit the bull’s-eye under the rele-
vant conditions. Sosa’s desire to seem to want to say that those conditions somehow are too appropriate—
too favourable, as it were—only makes sense if external conditions can’t play too large a role in generat-
ing success, which as we have seen is exactly what they cannot do if personalism is true, and epistemic 
virtues must generate success to a significant extent on account of features internal to the psychology of 
the person involved. 
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In other words, much like Greco and Riggs do in relation to the social environment in testimonial 
knowledge, Sosa acknowledges the role of features external to the psychology of the agent in his account 
of virtue. At the same time, his analogy between believers and the archer in the magnet scenario illus-
trates that he also seems to think that there’s a limit to how significant of a role such external factors can 
play in the explanation of success without taking away from the credit due to the relevant believer. How-
ever, if what has been argued in this section is point, it’s not clear that he can impose such a limit, unless 
he accepts personalism. In particular, were he to reject personalism, it’s not clear why the archer in the 
magnet scenario is to be denied any degree of credit, for reasons just discussed. In light of that fact, we 
can infer a commitment to personalism from what Sosa has to say about the role of external physical con-
ditions in the ascription of credit. 
 
2.5 From Personal to Social Virtue 
What has been argued so far provides us with reason to believe that virtue epistemologists across the the-
oretical spectrum—here represented by Baehr, Zagzebski, Greco, Riggs, and Sosa—are committed to the 
idea that epistemic virtues are personal virtues, in the sense of being possessed primarily on account of 
features internal to the psychology of the person. But here is the problem that arises if we factor in what 
we found in part 1: if we hold on to personalism, we cannot accommodate Larry. 
To see the tensions between personalism and the claim that Larry possesses knowledge, remember 
what was argued in part 1: while it should be uncontroversial that Larry knows in DEFERENCE, anyone 
who accepts that Larry knows in DEFERENCE also has to accept that he knows in BLIND DEFER-
ENCE. Consequently, Larry knows in BLIND DEFERENCE. Given universality, that means that he must 
possess some epistemic virtue in that scenario, since knowledge is to be accounted for in terms of epis-
temic virtues. However, if personalism is true, then virtues are possessed to a significant extent on 
account of features internal to the psychology of the person. To the extent that Larry possesses virtue—
i.e., possesses a disposition to attain epistemic success, such as true belief—he does so more or less ex-
clusively on account of being embedded in an epistemic environment wherein he happens to be 
surrounded by sources that are reliable in a modally robust manner. In other words, if personalism is true, 
Larry cannot possess epistemic virtue, and consequently cannot know. 
This means that, if we want to hold on to personalism in the face of BLIND DEFERENCE, then we 
either have to deny that Larry knows in DEFERENCE, or else reject universality. Denying that Larry 
knows in DEFERNCE seems implausible. Moreover, as we have also seen, giving up on universality has 
not seemed a very attractive option to virtue epistemologists in other contexts, and there is no reason to 
think that it would be an attractive option in this case either. Consequently, it should be considered good 
news that there is a way to hold on to universality, while accommodating BLIND DEFERENCE. The 
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way to do this is by rejecting personalism. By rejecting personalism, the virtue epistemologist can 
acknowledge the existence, not only of virtues possessed primarily on account of features internal to the 
psychology of the person, but also of social virtues. Social virtues are virtues possessed in whole or in 
large part, not on account of features internal to the psychology of the person, but on account of features 
of her social environment. As for Larry in BLIND DEFERENCE, the relevant feature would be that he is 
surrounded by reliable testifiers, in the actual world as well as in all nearby worlds. That is the feature that 
turns his doxastic disposition for blind trust into a virtue, and a social virtue in particular. 
To be clear, to say that social virtues are had primarily on account of features of one’s social envi-
ronment is neither to suggest that social virtues are virtues of social entities, nor to deny that virtues are 
psychological entities. Social virtues are and remain doxastic dispositions had by individuals, but the rel-
evant dispositions qualify as virtues wholly or in large part because of the social environment in which 
the agent finds herself. In other words, in limiting cases of social virtue, any answer to the question ‘Why 
is this agent virtuous?’ will not to any real degree be answerable by citing psychological features of the 
agent, since any explanation of why the relevant agent is reliable, and hence a candidate for virtue, needs 
to make substantive reference to features of her social environment. More specifically, such a reference 
needs to be made, unless we want to (a) deny that Larry knows in DEFERENCE, since accepting that 
Larry knows in DEFERENCE commits us to saying that he knows in BLIND DEFERENCE, and thereby 
also to the idea that he must possess a virtue in BLIND DEFERENCE; or (b) block that inference by 
denying universality. As noted a moment ago, neither option seems particularly attractive, which is exact-
ly what motivates the introduction of social virtues. 
Invoking the unattractiveness of (a) and (b) as a motivation for postulating social virtues assumes that 
there is no way to account for the virtue had by Larry in BLIND DEFERENCE without postulating social 
virtues. I have no argument to the effect that there cannot be another way. Instead, I will support the as-
sumption that there is no other way with reference to the failure of what I take to be the two most 
promising alternative strategies.  
 
2.6 Sosa’s Socially Seated Competencies 
The first strategy can be formulated in terms of Sosa’s ‘socially seated competencies’. Sosa postulates 
such competencies precisely to account for testimonial knowledge possessed in the context of testimonial 
beliefs ‘whose correctness […] owes little to [the hearer’s] own individual accomplishment, if all he does 
is to receive the information’.90 To explain such situations, Sosa suggests that we need to say that the 
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competence involved is ‘socially seated, instead, in some broader social unit’.91 Such a unit doesn’t re-
quire social organization. All it requires is a certain joint effort. In testimonial contexts in particular, the 
unit involves the ‘believer’s own competence to trust testimony, which helps account, at least in some 
small part, for why his belief is correct’.92 
Do socially seated competencies this still leave room for the hearer getting credit for success and, as 
such, for knowledge? Sosa seems to think that it does:  
 
In order to constitute knowledge, a testimony-derived belief must be accurate, and must manifest 
competence, which should not be thought to require that the most salient explanation of its being right 
must involve the individual competence manifested by the subject in holding that belief. The explana-
tory salient factors will probably lie elsewhere; what mainly accounts for the belief’s correctness will 
likely involve others and their cognitive accomplishments.93 
 
Given that knowledge is supposed to imply getting credit for success, and the fact that it’s not clear that 
you can (or should) plausibly get credit for success that’s mainly due to the achievements of others, it’s 
not obvious that Sosa can both accommodate testimonial knowledge by rejecting the saliency requirement 
and at the same time hold on to his credit theory of knowledge. Indeed, at this point, it’s helpful to re-
member Greco’s response to Lackey’s scenario (Section 1.4), and the manner in which he requires 
significant involvement by the hearer in testimonial contexts. Depending on where we put the bar for sig-
nificant involvement, it’s not obvious that hearers always are significantly involved (as we saw, that’s 
Lackey’s response94) but it’s clear why Greco would want to say that they are, given his credit theory. 
However, since we at present are more interested in what Sosa does commit to, rather than to what he 
should commit to, let us set this issue aside, and ask: Does what he says about testimonial knowledge 
amount to a rejection of personalism, contrary to what was suggested in Section 2.4? It’s not clear that it 
does. Granted, one way of reading Sosa here is as denying that epistemic virtues are necessarily possessed 
primarily on account of features internal to the psychology of the person. However, note that the virtue 
Sosa is concerned with in testimonial contexts is ‘socially seated […] in some broader social unit’.95 On a 
strong reading, personalism is the view that virtues are had by individuals to a significant extent on ac-
count of features internal to the psychology of the person, and that all virtues are had by individuals. On 
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that reading, Sosa wouldn’t be able to accept both personalism and socially seated competencies as these 
are, at most, ‘partially seated in [the] individual believer’.96 However, on a weak reading, personalism is 
simply the view that all epistemic virtues had by individuals are had by those individuals primarily on 
account of features internal to the psychology of the person. On that reading, we wouldn’t need to reject 
personalism in order to take on board socially seated virtues, since such virtues apply primarily, not to the 
individual, but to a social unit. 
If the weak reading of personalism is plausible, it therefore seems we might be able to hold on to per-
sonalism, while accommodating a case like Larry’s, so long as we take into account Sosa’s socially seated 
competencies. However, appearances are misleading: even if the weak reading of personalism is viable, 
socially seated competencies do not help account for Larry in BLIND DEFERENCE. To see why, con-
sider the case Sosa invokes for purposes of illustrating socially seated competencies. Having noted that, in 
testimonial contexts, the individual’s competence helps account, at least to some extent, for success, Sosa 
writes: 
 
Something similar holds good of socially seated competence generally. A quarterback may throw a 
touchdown pass, for example, thus exercising a competence. But this individual competence is only 
one part of a broader competence, seated in the whole offensive team, that more fully explains the 
successful touchdown pass, the apt performance of that quarterback. The pass receiver’s competence 
may be crucial, for example, along with the individual competences of the offensive linesmen, and so 
on.97 
 
What this illustration makes clear is that Sosa’s socially seated competencies really serve to account for 
shared credit. Indeed, Sosa refers to the credit had in the relevant contexts as ‘partial’ credit.98 However, 
it’s far less clear that such competencies can be invoked for purposes of explaining knowledge in what by 
all lights looks like that an absence of credit, such as in the case of Larry.99 Larry is in no way analogous 
to the quarterback who is exercising a non-trivial degree of skill in throwing the ball to the receiver. Larry 
is more analogous to someone who is holding on to the ball while sitting in a wheelchair, and is then 
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pushed over to the end zone.100 This is not to suggest that Sosa’s acknowledgement of socially seated 
competencies is not a welcome virtue epistemological acknowledgement of the social aspects of knowing. 
It is, however, to suggest that it’s not an acknowledgement that enables us to hold on to personalism 
while accommodating Larry, which is the possibility we are investigating here. 
 
2.7 Fricker’s Plural Virtues 
Let us consider a second strategy for holding on to personalism while accommodating Larry. We may get 
a sense of this strategy by sticking with Sosa’s football example, as just reimagined to involve Larry be-
ing pushed into the end zone in a wheelchair. We can imagine that this is something that the team in 
question has committed to doing; they want Larry to be a part of the game, even if involving him and still 
playing a good game will require great coordinative effort and skill on the part of the other players. And 
in so far as they pull it off, we might want to ascribe some virtue, not to Larry, but to the team, to 
acknowledge the success they have thereby achieved through a coordinated effort.  
In fact, the team would under these circumstances arguably qualify for what Miranda Fricker has re-
ferred to as a plural virtue.101 Plural virtues are virtues possessed, not by individuals, but by groups of 
individuals on account of a joint commitment to attain some goal, where the commitment enables the 
group to reliably attain the relevant goal. To use Fricker’s example, a night-watch team of soldiers might 
possess the plural virtue of vigilance through a joint commitment to a certain division of labor that has 
them reliably detect intruders. Crucially, plural virtues may be possessed by groups without being pos-
sessed by all or indeed by any individual member of the group—all that is required is a joint commitment 
and reliable achievement. 
Does taking there to be plural virtues imply a rejection of personalism? Again, that depends on how 
we understand personalism. As noted above, there is a weak reading of personalism on which it is simply 
the view that all epistemic virtues had by individuals are had by those individuals primarily on account of 
features internal to their psychology. On that reading, we do not need to reject personalism in order to 
take on board plural virtues, since plural virtues are not had by individuals. On a stronger reading, person-
alism implies that all virtues are had by individuals. On that reading, we cannot accept both personalism 
and plural virtue. Consequently, if plural virtues are to provide a way to both accommodate Larry and 
hold on to personalism, then we need to assume the weaker reading of personalism.  
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So, assume for the sake of argument that the weak reading of personalism is the most plausible read-
ing. If plural virtues, moreover, can account for Larry’s knowledge in BLIND DEFERENCE, then we no 
longer have a reason to postulate social virtue. More specifically, we may hold on to both universality and 
personalism (on the weak reading), and account for BLIND DEFERENCE in terms of plural virtues. 
What would the relevant account look like? Plural virtues apply to groups of people, and involve a com-
mitment by that group to attain some goal. Consequently, I take it that the most plausible account would 
assume a commitment on the part of Larry’s fellow inquirers to arrange themselves in such a manner that 
he receives reliable testimony, in the actual world as well as in all nearby possible worlds, whenever he 
consults them. That is, we would explain Larry’s knowledge in terms of a plural epistemic virtue of relia-
ble testimonial coordination on the part of his fellow inquirers. 
The problem with this account—or indeed with any account framed in terms of plural virtues—is the 
assumption of a commitment. The reason that this assumption is problematic is that we can imagine 
BLIND DEFERENCE to be a case wherein no one has made any commitment of the relevant kind. More 
specifically, we can imagine that Larry and his fellow inquirers in the case imagined just happen to be 
arranged, in the actual world as well as in all nearby possible world, in such a manner that Larry receives 
reliable testimony wherever he turns. Such a case is clearly possible. Moreover, if what has been argued 
in part 1 is on point, there is nothing about such a scenario that would rule out Larry having testimonial 
knowledge.102 As a result, unless we are willing to reject universality, we need a virtue epistemological 
account of Larry’s knowledge, and in the absence of any commitment of the kind required for plural vir-
tue, any account framed in terms of such virtue will not be able to do the job. 
 
2.8 Knowledge Through Social Virtue 
We have now considered the two most plausible candidates for virtue theories that would enable us to 
hold on to personalism while also accounting for the virtue involved in BLIND DEFERENCE. The fact 
that they both fail gives us reason to look elsewhere, and specifically to the kind of social virtues intro-
duced above (Section 2.5). After all, an account framed in terms of social virtue is able to account for 
Larry’s testimonial knowledge in BLIND DEFERENCE with reference to him being embedded in a so-
cial environment, in the actual world as well as in all nearby worlds, that is such that he receives reliable 
testimony wherever he turns, rendering his disposition to trust without discrimination a social epistemic 
virtue.  
This amounts to a quite ‘thin’ account of epistemic virtue, in that is framed in terms of nothing but re-
liable doxastic dispositions across the actual and all nearby possible worlds—no epistemic motivations, 
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no vetting, no positive reasons, no credit103, and no sensitivity to defeaters. But that’s as it should be. Re-
member, anyone who accepts that Larry knows in DEFERENCE also has to accept that he knows in 
BLIND DEFERENCE. Given universality, it follows that the virtue epistemologist needs to provide an 
account of the kind of virtue involved in the latter case. When moving from DEFERENCE to BLIND 
DEFERENCE, the only epistemically relevant feature of Larry’s situation that remains is a doxastic dis-
position that is reliable in a modally robust manner, on account of his epistemic environment. 
Consequently, if what has been argued in the preceding sections is correct, what we need to say is that 
having such a doxastic disposition is sufficient for virtue possession.104 
At this point, it might be objected that there is nothing sufficiently novel about social virtues. In what 
way, the reader might ask, does the acknowledgement of the role of our social environment in us coming 
to know things really require a fundamental change in virtue epistemology? The answer is: on account of 
the widespread commitment to personalism. As was argued above, we cannot hold on to personalism, and 
still account for the virtue possessed by Larry in BLIND DEFERENCE. That’s a problem, since part 1 of 
this paper argued that we need to be able to accommodate that virtue, unless we want to either deny that 
Larry knows in DEFERENCE, or reject universality. Moreover, since the evidence provided above sug-
gests that personalism is a fairly central commitment for virtue epistemologists across the theoretical 
spectrum (see Sections 2.2-4), it seems fair to say that the change required in so far as we need to reject 
personalism is a fundamental one. 
Another way to push the novelty worry is as follows: As we have seen, virtue epistemologists like 
Greco and Sosa already acknowledge both our dependence as individuals on other inquirers as well as the 
dependency of our competencies on appropriate external conditions. So what is novel about the present 
investigation’s focus on social dependence? In answering this question, we should note that accepting that 
there are social virtues doesn’t involve accepting some new kind of factor so far completely ignored by 
virtue epistemologists (although it seems fair to say that virtue epistemology has been slower to 
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acknowledge our dependence on others, compared to other parts of epistemology). Rather, accepting that 
there are social virtues involves acknowledging the extent to which social factors can play a role in us 
coming to know things. In other words, the problem is that the relevant virtue epistemologists do not go 
far enough in their acknowledgement of the role of external factors, and of social factors in particular—
far enough, that is, to accommodate cases such as the one involving Larry. And, again, that’s a problem 
since we need to be able to accommodate Larry, unless we want to either deny that Larry knows in DEF-
ERENCE, or reject universality. 
By rejecting personalism and invoking social virtues, however, we can hold on to universality, while 
still accommodating cases wherein a commitment to personalism would render us unable to account for 
certain instances of knowledge. Consequently, if the above is on the right track, then another bifurcation 
of virtue is called for, in addition to the one discussed in Section 1.1 between virtues accompanied by ep-
istemic motivations and virtues not (necessarily) accompanied by such motivations. The additional 
bifurcation called for is between personal and social virtues, the latter being virtues possessed in whole or 
in large part on account of the possessor being embedded in a social environment that makes for modally 
robust reliability. That is what we learn from reflecting on cases of blind deference. Granted, the success 
or failure of an inquiry sometimes has a personal source, as Baehr suggests.105 But given our heavy epis-
temic dependence on others, such success or failure often has a social source, as has been acknowledged 
by many social epistemologists of late.106 And by acknowledging that there are social virtues, virtue epis-
temology can help account for such successes or failures in a manner that it cannot if we hold on to 
personalism. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Recently, it has become popular to account for knowledge and other epistemic states in terms of epistemic 
virtues. The present paper focused on an epistemic virtue relevant when deferring to others in testimonial 
contexts. It was argued that, while many virtue epistemologists will accept that epistemic virtue can be 
exhibited in cases involving epistemically motivated hearers, carefully vetting their testimonial sources 
for signs of untrustworthiness prior to deferring, anyone who accepts that also has to accept that an agent 
may exhibit epistemic virtue in certain cases of blind deference, involving someone soaking up every-
thing he is told without any hesitation. Moreover, it was suggested that, in order to account for the kind of 
virtue involved in the relevant cases of blind deference, virtue epistemologists need to abandon the wide-
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spread assumption of personalism, i.e., the idea that virtue is possessed primarily on account of features 
internal to the psychology of the person, and accept that some virtues are social virtues, possessed in 
whole or in large part on account of the person in question being embedded in a reliable social environ-
ment.107 
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